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Abstract: Does the disclosure of information about corrupt activities induce a sustained reduction in 
corruption? We use publicly released routine audits of municipal governments in Puerto Rico to answer 
this question. We first develop a political agency model where voters re-elect incumbents based on their 
performance while in office. We show that, because voters cannot directly observe incumbents’ actions, 
an incumbent whose reputation improved in the previous term is likely to engage in more rent-seeking 
activities in a future term. Guided by this model, we use longitudinal data on audit results to examine the 
long-term consequences of providing information to voters on levels of political corruption. We find that 
municipal  corruption  levels  in  subsequent  audits  are  on  average  the  same i n  municipalities  audited 
preceding the previous election and those not audited then. In spite of this, mayors in municipalities 
audited preceding the previous election have higher re-election rates, suggesting that audits enable voters 
to select more competent politicians. We conclude that short-term information dissemination policies do 
not  necessarily  align  politicians’  long-term  actions  with  voter  preferences a s  p o l i t i c i a n s  e x p l o i t  t h e i r  
reputational gains by extracting more rents from office. 
 
                                                 
* This is a substantially revised version of an earlier draft circulated with the title “Does Exposing Corrupt Politicians Reduce 
Corruption?”  We  thank  Victor  Aguirregabiria,  Tim  Besley,  Matilde  Bombardini,  Leah  Brooks,  Adriana  Camacho,  Taryn 
Dinkelman, Leo Feler, Fred Finan, Steven Haider, Anke Kessler, Monica Martínez-Bravo, Ben Nyblade, Torsten Persson, Nancy 
Qian, Imran Rasul, Aloysius Siow, Gary Solon, Alessandro Tarozzi, Duncan Thomas, Pedro Vicente, as well as other seminar 
and conference participants at Carleton, the CIFAR IOG Program Spring 2009 Meetings, Duke, Michigan State, NEUDC 2010, 
SAIS, Simon Fraser, University of British Columbia, UC Berkeley, University College London, Università Bocconi, and Yale for 
helpful comments and suggestions. We are especially grateful to Hon. José M. Díaz Saldaña, Comptroller of Puerto Rico, for 
providing us access to the municipal government audit reports of the Office of the Comptroller of Puerto Rico, and to Fred Finan 
for invaluable help and advice in the construction of the audit reports data. Aileen Cardona, Laura Delgado, María del Mar Ortiz, 
Zorimar Rivera, Vilma López, Adriana Robertson, and Julie Wilson provided superb research assistance. Research support from 
the  Canadian  Institute  for  Advanced  Research  (CIFAR),  the  Social  Sciences  and  Humanities  Research  Council  of  Canada 
(SSHRC), and the University of Puerto Rico Social Research Center and Office of the Dean for Graduate Studies and Research is 
gratefully acknowledged. We are responsible for any errors. 
 
† Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Toronto, BREAD, and CIFAR. Address: 150 St. George St., 
Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G7, Canada.  Tel: 416-946-5299. Fax: 416-978-6713. E-mail: gustavo.bobonis@utoronto.ca. 
 
‡  Associate  Professor,  Department  of  Political  Science,  University  of  Puerto  Rico-Río  Piedras.  Address:  P.O.  Box  23445, 
University  of  Puerto  Rico,  Río  Piedras  Campus,  San  Juan,  PR  00931,  USA.  Tel:  787-764-0000,  ext.  4332.  E-mail: 
luisraulcamara@gmail.com. 
 
§ Postdoctoral Fellow, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. Address: 5100 Jacobs Center, Evanston, IL, 
60208, USA. E-mail: r-schwabe@kellogg.northwestern.edu.   1 
I. Introduction 
In a well-functioning representative democracy, citizens should select competent politicians to 
administer public affairs and hold them accountable for their performance. To succeed in these tasks, 
citizens must have appropriate information about candidates’ characters, abilities, and performances while 
in office (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Besley 2006). Accordingly, a growing body of research 
finds that voters’ access to evaluations of politician performance enhances government responsiveness, 
reduces corruption and rent-seeking behaviors, and promotes electoral accountability in the short-run.
1 
However, it is less well understood whether information dissemination policies can induce a sustained 
reduction in rent seeking, aligning politicians’ long-term actions with voters’ preferences. These long-
term consequences are particularly relevant given the dynamic incentives – re-election incentives and 
reputational concerns – faced by politicians.
2 
The central goal of this paper is to study the long-run corruption consequences caused by the 
disclosure to voters of information about politicians’ corrupt actions through audit reports. To guide our 
empirical analysis, we first develop a simple model of political agency. In this model, voters decide 
whether to re-elect an incumbent politician but are unable to observe his degree of competence or actions 
as an officeholder. Publicly disseminated audit reports provide information to voters on these actions. If 
voters re-elect incumbent mayors based on their performance while in office, a mayor whose reputation 
has improved in the past can exploit this reputational improvement to engage in rent-seeking activities in 
a later term. Given these perverse incentives, we show that mayors in municipalities whose actions, either 
corrupt or honest, have been made public in the past will be on average as corrupt in the next term as 
those whose actions have not been made public. 
The empirical content of the theory imposes demanding requirements for validation. We need 
exogenous variation in publicly available information on politician performance, as well as longitudinal 
data on political corruption. We take advantage of a unique setting that provides us with the opportunity 
to examine such relationships. The government of Puerto Rico has established an independent body that 
systematically conducts municipal government audits, the findings of which are made publicly available 
and  disseminated  to  media  sources.  We  employ  a  longitudinal  dataset  of  the  extent  of  corruption 
constructed from the audit reports for all municipalities during the period 1987-2005, and exploit the 
exogenous  ordering  of  municipal  audits  to  help  us  establish  the  causal  relationships  of  interest. 
Specifically, we first observe whether a government is revealed to be clean or corrupt before a particular 
                                                 
1 For evidence regarding government responsiveness, see e.g., Besley and Burgess (2002) and Björkman and Svensson (2009); 
regarding corruption and rent-seeking behaviors, see e.g., Reinikka and Svensson (2005) and Olken (2007); regarding electoral 
accountability, see e.g., Ferraz and Finan (2008) and Banerjee et al (2010). 
2 Various models of political agency predict that when information serves as a disciplining device for corruptible politicians in 
the current term, this allows for some corruptible politicians to ‘pool’ with non-corruptible types, enhancing the likelihood of 
corruption in future terms. See Besley (2006) for a survey and a detailed discussion.   2 
election – when the results of the audits are most salient to voters – or after the election.
3 We then 
compare the governments’ levels of reported corruption across these (pre-election/post-election audit) 
groups of municipalities, both during the audited term and in subsequent terms. 
We find that pre-election audits induce a significant reduction in municipal corruption levels of 
approximately 67 percent, as well as an increase in incumbent mayors’ electoral accountability. We also 
document that negative pre-election audits lead to a significant degree of positive selection of subsequent 
mayors based on their pre-incumbency earnings. These findings are remarkably consistent with the short-
run  disciplining,  sanctioning,  and  selection e f f e c t s  o f  a u d i t i n g  p r o g r a m s  f o u nd  in  previous  field 
experimental  studies.
4  However,  in  contrast  to  these  desirable  short-run  consequences  of  the  audits, 
municipal corruption levels in the subsequent round of audits are on average the same in municipalities 
audited preceding the previous election and those whose audits became publicly available afterwards.  
Thus,  short-term  information  dissemination  policies  do  not  necessarily  align  politicians’  long-term 
actions with voter preferences as politicians exploit their reputational gains by engaging in more corrupt 
practices. 
To further examine whether dynamic reputational concerns are at play, we test an additional 
prediction of the theory. Our model suggests that an incumbent’s expected reputation, i.e. the likelihood 
that he is a competent type, is better following an audited period. Because more able types are more likely 
to  refrain  from  corruption,  the  model  predicts  a  positive  selection  effect  on  re-election  rates  in  the 
subsequent  term.  More  interestingly,  although  a  mayor  with  a  better  reputation  should  be  more  rent 
seeking, in equilibrium voters’ re-election rules are less stringent so that the incumbent finds them easier 
to  meet.  Thus,  both  the  selection  and  sanctioning  effects  should  induce  higher  re-election  rates  of 
incumbents in the following election, particularly among mayors that audits show have refrained from 
rent seeking in the previous audit. We find evidence of these positive, next electoral cycle re-election 
effects using longitudinal data on the re-election rates of incumbent mayors. These relationships also 
support the hypothesis that information about corruption induces an improvement in accountability in the 
short-run, and yield perverse incentives in the long-run.
5 
The research design and the richness of the data allow us to distinguish our explanation for 
corrupt  behavior f r o m  a  variety  of  alternative  interpretations.  First,  even  though  the  timing  of  the 
                                                 
3 The contrast between the pre- and post-election audits may have two (or more) sources. The information contained in audits 
may be of greater immediate interest to voters when an election is looming, so the media invests more resources in disseminating 
audit results and/or the information is more salient to voters. Even if information from post-election audits does reach voters, they 
may not use it during the subsequent election because of recency bias – the tendency for voters to place more weight on recent 
information (see Berry and Howell (2007), and the survey by Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000)). 
4 The disciplining and electoral accountability effects are consistent with the experimental findings in Olken (2007) and Ferraz 
and Finan (2008), respectively. As for politician selection effects, see for instance Besley (2005), Besley, Pande and Rao (2007), 
and Brollo et al (2010). 
5 This is consistent with information dissemination on politicians’ actions leading to an increase in ex ante voter welfare.    3 
municipal government audits is pre-determined, our results would be undermined if the actual auditing 
process differs systematically before and after elections. We do not, however, find any evidence that 
auditors were corrupt or that mayors with more political power or mayors affiliated with higher levels of 
government are more likely to receive preferential audits. A second concern is that political cycles are 
potentially correlated with our comparison of municipalities based on the timing of the audits. However, 
we report evidence that the actual timing of the audited periods does not influence our results. Finally, we 
present  evidence  inconsistent  with  other  plausible  channels,  such  as  responses  from  higher  levels  of 
government to audit results. 
The  study  contributes  to  the  growing  empirical  literature  documenting  how  electoral 
accountability,  and  information  provision  in  particular,  influences  political  corruption.  Using  a 
randomized  experiment  in  Indonesian  villages,  Olken  (2007)  analyzes  whether  different  monitoring 
mechanisms reduce corruption in infrastructure projects, and finds that a top-down auditing scheme is 
effective in decreasing corruption in the short-run.
6 Most notably, in a series of papers Ferraz and Finan 
(2008; 2010) use similarly objective measures of corruption from audit reports of municipal governments 
in Brazil to study whether electoral accountability serves as a mechanism to align politicians’ actions with 
voters’ preferences. Specifically, Ferraz and Finan (2008) show that electoral accountability is enhanced 
when information about corrupt practices in audited municipalities is publicized, whereas Ferraz and 
Finan (2010) show the extent to which re-election incentives affect political corruption in the short-run.
7 
Finally, Niehaus and Sukthankar (2011) show evidence of dynamic incentives for the corrupt behaviors of 
Indian  bureaucrats.  Our  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  by  providing  the  first  evidence  (to  our 
knowledge) on the diverging long and short run impacts of information revelation on political corruption. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background on Puerto Rico’s municipal 
auditing program, the municipal government system, and the national debates that influence local politics. 
We follow with a description of the data in Section III. Section IV presents our political agency model 
and discusses its main empirical implications. Section V discusses the empirical implementation of the 
model, the study’s research design, and the main identifying assumptions. We present central empirical 
results of the paper and robustness evidence from the tests in Sections VI and VII. The paper concludes in 
Section VIII with a discussion of our work in the context of the literature on voter information and 
political corruption. 
 
                                                 
6 Stromberg (1999), Gentzkow (2006), Gentzkow, Glaeser and Goldin (2006) provide historical evidence of the consequences of 
media access on political behaviors. Besley and Burgess (2002) show that newspaper circulation affects the responsiveness of 
state governments in India to negative shocks to food production and flooding. 
7 For evidence on the policy consequences of re-election incentives, see Besley and Case (1995) and List and Sturm (2006). Alt, 
Bueno de Mesquita, and Rose (2009) find that term limits affect the expected quality of incumbents. Martínez-Bravo et al (2007) 
study the consequences of the introduction of local elections for local politicians’ accountability.   4 
II. Background 
II.A. Municipal Government Administration and Politics 
Municipal governments in Puerto Rico are the level of government closest to citizens. A mayor 
and a local assembly govern the municipality; these officials are elected for a four-year term following the 
Commonwealth (and U.S. federal) government electoral cycle.
8 Mayors and municipal council members 
do not face term limits. In fact, mayors from municipalities where their party is very dominant tend to 
have high re-election rates. Also, although the local assembly is usually under the control of the dominant 
party, the law guarantees some representation for minority parties (i.e., a small number of seats for the 
party that ended in second place, one seat for the party in third place). Minority assembly members 
usually  carry  out  oversight  work,  exposing  waste  and  corruption. T h e  m a y o r  a p p o i n t s  t h e  t o p  
management of the municipality. 
Although municipal governments possess a greater degree of autonomy than counties and cities 
in the United States, their sphere of influence is somewhat more limited. The bulk of the services they 
provide  are  infrastructure  construction  and  maintenance,  solid  waste  management,  and  public  health 
services. T h e r e  i s  h e t e r o g e n e i t y  i n  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ’  f i s c a l  a u t o n o m y ,  b o t h  i n  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  r a i s e  t a x  
revenues and in their autonomy in expenditure decisions.
9 
Finally, we briefly describe the nature of political cleavages, party structure, and the degree of 
political participation and competition at the Commonwealth level, all of which are central to municipal 
politics. The Commonwealth of  Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory of the United States, and 
national politics are essentially shaped by the debate over P.R.’s political status relative to the United 
States. The three main political status alternatives are federal statehood, independence, and continuation 
of the current Commonwealth status. These positions shape the political party system and are the main 
political cleavages (Anderson 1989, 1998; Cámara Fuertes 2005). The New Progressive Party (NPP) 
supports federal statehood, the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) supports the Commonwealth status, and 
the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) supports independence. The NPP and the PDP are the two 
main political parties; they are similar in their electoral support and regularly exchange the reigns of 
power. The PIP is a relatively small party, and usually receives between three and five percent of votes. 
                                                 
8 The size of the municipal assembly, which varies between 12 and 16 members, is a step function of the population that resides 
within its boundaries. 
9 In 1991 the legislature approved a series of laws as part of a package of municipal reforms. These municipal reforms, of which 
Act No. 81 was the centerpiece, greatly increased the municipal governments’ autonomy vis a vis the central government and 
allowed them a greater role in the social and economic development, as well as the spatial planning, of their territories. Thus once 
the municipal reform laws became effective some municipalities began to assert a greater role in education and law enforcement, 
areas  previously  reserved  for  the  central  government.  In  practice,  the  degree  of  autonomy  and  sphere  of  action  that  each 
municipality has is related to its size. Large municipal governments with active mayors such as San Juan (the capital), Guaynabo, 
Bayamón, and Caguas have asserted a significant degree of autonomy. Smaller municipalities with access to fewer resources are 
still significantly more dependent on the central government.   5 
The intensity of the status debate supersedes all other debates, including the economic one typical 
of most nation states. It has been argued that, as a consequence, parties hold similar positions on many 
issues and the NPP and PDP have been labeled as catch-all parties (Meléndez 1998). Partisanship in 
Puerto Rico is high and most voters vote for the same party in the executive, legislative and municipal 
ballot. Thus, electoral landslides and coattail effects are common. As a general rule (with some notable 
exceptions), the incumbent governor’s party overwhelmingly controls both chambers of the Legislative 
Assembly  and  a  majority  of  municipal  governments.  Unlike  the  United  States—and  similar  to  Latin 
American and European nations—Puerto Rico has a disciplined party system. This allows for effective 
partisan control of all levels of government when the same party controls all three administrative levels. 
Given the constitutional, and often personal, strength of the governor, his or her ideology or point of view 
is forcefully applied to all levels of government. 
Some  have  argued  that  these  distinct  cleavages  may  yield  municipal  political  machines  that 
provide patronage. There is evidence of this claim in audit reports and court cases (see Section II.B). 
However, municipal political corruption is a phenomenon that predates the current political environment 
– early 20
th century U.S. colonial administrations argued that this corruption was egregious even during 
the late Spanish colonial regime (Report of the Governor of Porto Rico 1902). In fact, the early U.S. 
colonial  administration  founded  the  Office  of  the  Auditor i n  1 9 00,  a  precursor  to  the  Office  of  the 
Comptroller of Puerto Rico, to address governance issues. 
 
II.B. The OCPR Municipal Government Auditing Program 
The Office of the Comptroller of Puerto Rico (“OCPR”) is an autonomous government agency 
created  by  the  1952  Constitution  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Puerto  Rico.  Its  mission  is  to  “audit  the 
property and public funds transactions with independence and objectivity to determine if they have been 
done in accordance to the law[, and] promote the effective and efficient use of the government resources 
[…]” (Office of the Comptroller 2009). To achieve its objectives, the OCPR periodically audits state-level 
government agencies and public corporations, including the legislative and judicial branches, as well as 
municipal governments. 
The  OCPR  has  been  carrying  out  audits  on  municipal  governments a n d  g e n e r a t i n g  and 
disseminating  reports  uninterruptedly  since  1953. A c c o r d i n g  t o  i t s  c o n s t i t u t i v e  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  m u n i c i p a l  
governments  ought  to  be  audited  every  other  fiscal  year.  However,  due  to  the  OCPR’s  resource 
constraints, there may be some delay in the timing of the audit. Importantly for our design, the order of 
the audits follows a routine pattern: municipalities are audited following a pre-specified order established 
in the 1950s. Once all municipalities have been audited, a new auditing round takes place following the 
same pre-specified order.   6 
Once a municipality is identified to be audited in a fiscal year, the OCPR sends a team of auditors 
to gather preliminary information on a subset of activities and transactions which have taken place in the 
time  period  since  the  latest  audit  coverage  period.  Following  this  preliminary  audit,  a  team  of 
approximately 10 OCPR auditors are sent to the municipality to examine these accounts and documents, 
as well as to inspect for the existence and quality of public work construction and delivery of public 
services. Auditors also interview municipality officials, members of the local community, as well as 
municipal council members, in order to get direct complaints about any malfeasance. Once the audit is 
complete, the auditing team completes a preliminary audit report. This preliminary report is shared with 
the municipality officials (i.e., the mayor and top management) to provide them with an opportunity to 
contest its findings. Once the response is received and evaluated, a final report is issued and disseminated 
to the public and to media sources through press conferences (more recently, reports are also being posted 
on the Internet). Although the OCPR cannot officially classify findings as corrupt violations or not, the 
agency refers findings of misuse of public funds to the P.R. Department of Justice and/or to the state-level 
executive  branch’s  Office  of  Government  Ethics.  The  OCPR  may  publish  multiple  reports  on  a 
municipality for one auditing period depending on the size or complexity of the municipal government. 
A number of measures are taken to minimize potential biases in the conduct of the audits and in 
the dissemination of their findings. First, there is a constitutionally defined objective to provide the OCPR 
with a substantial degree of autonomy from the rest of the central government structures, in order to 
isolate the agency from undue external interference. To help achieve this, the Comptroller is appointed by 
the P.R. Governor for a ten-year term.
10 Second, the OCPR is technically under the state legislature. Since 
the agency’s activities are focused on the executive branch, this gives it an additional layer of protection 
from undue influence. Third, the auditors, who are hired based on a competitive public examination and 
earn highly competitive salaries, receive extensive training prior to visiting the municipalities. Finally, in 
order  to  reduce/minimize  local-level  conflicts  of  interest,  individual  auditors  are  precluded  from 
participating in audits of their municipality of residence. 
All seventy-eight municipalities were audited during our period of interest (1987-2005) multiple 
times. The timing of the dissemination of the reports is depicted in Figure I. As can be seen, there is a 
tendency to publish reports at the end of the central government’s fiscal year (i.e., in June) (as well as a 
tendency to publish more reports in recent years).
11 Importantly, there is no insignificant tendency for the 
OCPR to publish a disproportionate number of reports in the months preceding an election (i.e. August 
                                                 
10 The appointment requires the advice and consent of the members of both legislative chambers. In addition, the person can only 
be removed from office while serving the term by an impeachment procedure. Third Article, Section 22 of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
11 For the 1997-2000 and 2001-2004 terms, almost all the municipalities were audited at least once. José M. Díaz Saldaña, the 
Comptroller appointed in October 1997, made a point to audit all municipalities at the beginning of his term, a fact clearly shown 
by the data.   7 
through October) (Figure I, Panel A). There is also no evidence of bias in the publishing of reports for 
municipalities in which the incumbent mayor is in the opposition to the Governor in office or to the party 
of the Governor who appointed the Comptroller (Panel B). This serves as prima facie evidence that the 
agency does not time the dissemination of findings to influence electoral results. 
Each  report  contains,  among  other  information,  the  period  covered  by  the  audit  and,  most 
importantly, an itemized list describing each irregularity. Based on our evaluation of the reports, we 
classified irregularities into those associated with corruption and those that represent waste and/or poor 
administration. A more stringent classification involves using only those irregularities referred to the 
Department of Justice.
12 As expected, corruption in municipal governments in Puerto Rico takes diverse 
forms, but corruption schemes used by local politicians and bureaucrats are based on a combination of 
fraud in procurement, the use of fake receipts (i.e., “phantom” firms), the illegal hiring of employees, and 
over-invoicing the value of products or services. In addition, the audit reports also suggest that some 
individuals simply divert resources for personal purposes. Since these strategies are complementary in 
allowing government representatives to appropriate resources (and following the existing literature), we 
combine these into a single measure (see Section III.A). 
Some examples will help illustrate the types of irregularities uncovered by the audits.
13 In the 
municipality of Maunabo during February-March 1997, contracts for the pavement and maintenance of 
roads summing up to approximately 138K USD were partitioned into four separate projects in order to 
avoid  having  to  carry  out  a  public  auction.
14 M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  a u d i t o r s  w e r e  u n a b l e  t o  c o n f i r m  t h e  
authenticity of other quotes submitted for the projects. We classified this finding as an instance of fraud in 
procurement. Second, in the municipality of Vieques during October 1995, the municipal Auction Board 
carried out an auction for the construction of four classrooms in the school at Barrio Playa Grande. The 
Board did not adjudicate the contract, in spite of there being valid bids by two independent contractors for 
225K  and  340K  USD,  respectively.  In  a  second  auction  in  November  2005,  the  second  contractor 
submitted the only bid for the project, for 325K USD. In December 2005, the mayor signed the contract 
for the project with the second contractor for 285K USD. These actions by the municipal managers 
caused the municipality to pay 60K USD in excess for the completion of the project. We classified this 
second finding as a case of auction fraud in procurement and over-invoicing. 
As an example of corruption in the hiring of municipal employees, the case of the municipality of 
Toa Baja is illustrative. In a report published in June 2000, the OCPR reports the illegal hiring of 22 
individuals who were relatives of the mayor and 11 individuals who were relatives of members of the 
                                                 
12 The reports also contain information on the area of government in which the irregularity took place (e.g., public infrastructure, 
law enforcement), as well as – if available - the misappropriated amount and the date(s) of the act. 
13 For details of the audit report findings, see excerpts from these in Appendix B. 
14 The 1991 Municipal Government Law (“Ley de Municipios Autónomos del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico de 1991 
(Law Num. 81) establishes that for any project exceeding 40K USD, the municipal government must carry out a public audit.   8 
Municipal Assembly. Twenty-one of these individuals, hired between September 1991 and October 1997, 
did not have the academic requirements or other minimum requirements to serve in their posts. These and 
other  documented  irregularities,  including  the  excess  compensation  of  municipal  employees  by 
approximately 262K USD, are classified as one finding of corruption in HR practices. Analogous findings 
in the municipalities of Cidra and Maricao are available in Appendix B. 
Other examples of corruption in Maricao and Hormigueros illustrate instances of over-invoicing. 
In October 1998, the mayors in both municipalities formalized contracts for the collection and disposal of 
debris resulting from the damages caused by Hurricane Georges (in September 1998), for an estimated 
cost of 4.20 and 3.69 million USD (the cost per cubic yard of 28 and 26 USD), respectively. The OCPR 
reported evidence from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers of over-invoicing in both cases, as the independent contractors submitted invoices for the 
collection and disposal of 155,157 and 31,508 cubic yards of debris, whereas it was identified that they 
collected 50,157 and 51,683. This represented over-invoicing by approximately 2.94 and 0.75 million 
USD, respectively. The OCPR referred the violations to the Department of Justice. As a consequence of 
the audit report, the former (two-term) mayor of Hormigueros was convicted on extortion and bribery 
charges for requesting and receiving 100K USD in kickbacks from the owner of the contracting firm.
15 In 
contrast, the mayor of Maricao (in his third term) was re-elected in 2004, following the dissemination of 
the audit report in 2001. 
News on the findings from the audit reports are routinely reported in the island-wide press – the 
main sources are of OCPR press conferences and releases as well as opposition candidates’ campaigns. 
Although we do not have direct evidence showing that voters learned about the audit reports, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the information from the audits did reach voters. For instance, an article published 
on September 25th 2008 (preceding the 2008 election) in a major newspaper regarding the outcome of a 
recent  audit  of  the  municipality  of  San  Juan  highlighted  findings  of  mismanagement  attributed  to 
municipal  employees.  Specifically,  the  report  highlighted  that  Jorge  Santini  – t h e  m a y o r  – a n d  t h e  
municipality’s finance team did not appropriately administer the municipality’s finances and incurred in 
extravagant/unnecessary expenditures to highlight the Mayor’s image. The report was used by Ferdinand 
Pérez (the opposition candidate) to declare that Santini was “a disaster as an administrator”; and the 
statement was later challenged by the incumbent (Hopgood Dávila 2008). In spite of this finding of 
plausible misuse of funds, Santini – a mayor in his second term – was re-elected for a third term. 
 
III. Data 
                                                 
15 See El Pueblo de Puerto Rico, Apelado v. Francisco Javier Rivera Toro, Apelante. KLAN0501622. Tribunal de Apelaciones de 
Puerto Rico, Región Judicial de Mayagüez. 2009 PR App. LEXIS 3664, 20 de octubre de 2009.   9 
III.A. Measures of Corruption based on the Audit Reports 
The main data sources for the study are the municipal audit reports conducted by the OCPR. In 
this study we work with all municipal audit reports during the 1987-2005 period, which are relevant for 
the 1988 through 2004 elections. Note that there were two Comptrollers during the period for which we 
use the audit reports: Ileana Colón Carlo (1987-1997) and Manuel Díaz Saldaña (1997-2010).
 16 
Each report contains a list of findings and a detailed description of each. These are classified as 
main  and  secondary  findings.  Main  findings  are  actions  that  have  substantive  consequences,  while 
secondary findings are those considered by the OCPR not to have serious consequences. Each reported 
finding consists of a detailed explanation of a situation, the implicated individuals (if identifiable), and the 
reason why it is considered a violation or irregularity. We generate codes from each report’s list of 
findings.
17  For each finding we coded the type of individual implicated in the finding – whether it was (i) 
the  mayor  or  vice  mayor,  (ii)  a  member  of  the  municipality’s  top  management s u c h  a s  t h e  f i n a n c e  
director, (iii) a rank and file employee of the municipality, or (iv) whether the individual cannot be 
identified. 
The research team also classified the findings based on the type of act. Although corruption in 
municipal  governments  in  Puerto  Rico  takes  diverse  forms,  most  corruption  schemes  used  by  local 
politicians and bureaucrats to appropriate resources are based on a combination of fraud in procurement, 
the use of fake receipts, “phantom” firms, or “phantom” employees, and over-invoicing the value of 
products  or  services.  In  addition,  the  audit  reports  also  suggest  that  some  individuals  simply  divert 
resources for personal purposes. We also coded the area of government activity in which the act took 
place (e.g., public infrastructure, law enforcement), the misappropriated amount (if stated), the date(s) of 
the act, and whether the finding was referred to the P.R. Department of Justice. Most importantly, we 
created  a  code  that  specified  whether  the  finding  constituted  an  act  of  corruption  or  not.  We 
operationalize corruption as an act by any municipal employee that led to a personal financial or political 
benefit.
18 Thus, the mayor receiving a bribe for a contract, or using municipal employees for his or her 
electoral campaign would be considered in our coding scheme as acts of corruption. On the other hand, 
poor bookkeeping was not (unless the report stated that it directly involved the cover-up of a corrupt 
violation). 
                                                 
16 Díaz Saldaña exceeded his ten-year term because the then-governor did not submit a candidate to the legislative assembly 
when his term expired (in 2007), and the incoming governor selected a replacement in 2010. The Constitution states that the 
incumbent Comptroller will continue to occupy his position until he resigns or is substituted by a new one. 
17 Before we began the coding process, the three (3) research assistants were given extensive training in content analysis, coding, 
and the details of the audit reports. We also ran tests for inter-coder and intra-coder reliability.  The process continued until coder 
reliability was at least 0.9.  The same coders worked with the reports throughout the project. Finally, a fourth research assistant 
examined the data to check for any errors. 
18 This definition is similar to the one used by the OCPR, which states that corruption is the use of government functions for 
private gain (Díaz Saldaña 2007). However, the OCPR does not specify whether a finding is considered a corrupt violation or 
not.   10 
To  construct  measures o f  corrupt  violations,  we  follow  Ferraz  and  Finan  (2008;  2010)  and 
combine these indicators by summing up the number of times each one of these irregularities appear, 
overall and by category. However, in contrast to their previous work, because the OCPR may publish 
multiple reports on a municipality during one auditing period and this depends on the size or complexity 
of the municipal government, we normalize our measures by the number of reports published in that 
auditing period.
19 Finally, as will be made clearer once we discuss the study’s research design, we define 
the time periods preceding each election as the two years preceding the election, and the post-election 
audit reports as those published in the two-year period following it. To take into account the fact that a 
subset of the municipalities has audit reports published in both periods, for these we aggregate only those 
reports published before the election and assign them to the pre-election audit group. 
 
III.B. Other Data Sources 
We employ two additional datasets available from the P.R. State Electoral Commission (CEE). 
The  first  comprises  the  electoral  results  of  the  municipal  and  statewide  general  elections  for  each 
municipality for election years 1988 through 2004. These data allow us to construct measures such as 
whether the incumbent mayor runs for re-election in the general election, whether he/she is re-elected, the 
vote share and win margin for the election, his/her political party affiliation, whether he/she is in the 
opposition to the incumbent party in power at the state level, and the terms in office. The second dataset 
was compiled from publicly available state-level income tax returns for the four year period preceding 
each of the 2000 and 2004 elections. All candidates are required by law to submit these documents to the 
CEE in order to be certified, and they subsequently become part of the public record. 
As for municipal government-level outcomes that may be influenced by incumbent politicians, 
we use annual municipal government budget data for the fiscal years 1991-92 through 2007-08. Finally, 
to capture underlying variation in municipal characteristics, we rely on the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census of 
Population for Puerto Rico. We use measures of the proportion of adult individuals ages 25 and older 
with schooling attainment levels lower than ninth grade, with a high school education or more, and with a 
college education or more, as well as the municipality’s household median income and poverty ratio for 
the years 1989 and 1999. Finally, we use information on municipality-level annual unemployment rates 
from the P.R. Department of Labor. Descriptive statistics of these variables are available in Table I. 
 
IV. Theoretical Framework 
                                                 
19 The mean number of reports per audited municipality during this period ranged from 1.2 for the 1988 period to 2.1 for the 2000 
period.   11 
In this section, we present a simple model that helps interpret our findings. We utilize the political 
agency framework studied by Schwabe (2010) and others, whereby voters decide whether to re-elect an 
incumbent politician but are unable to observe his degree of competence or his actions. If voters re-elect 
incumbent mayors based on their performance in office, a mayor whose reputation has improved in the 
past  can  exploit  this  reputational  improvement t o  e n g a g e  i n  r e n t -seeking  activities,  leaving  voters 
indifferent between re-electing him and electing an unknown challenger. Given these perverse reputation 
incentives, the model predicts that re-elected mayors who have been shown to have either refrained from 
or engaged in rent-seeking activities in the past will be on average as corrupt in future terms than mayors 
whose levels of corruption have not been exposed. 
 
Reputation and Accountability in Repeated Elections 
Consider a discrete-time, infinite horizon model of municipal politics. In each period (indexed by 
t ∈ {1,2, ...}), a representative voter must select a politician to administer local public affairs. Following 
each election, the elected politician chooses a level of effort e ∈ [0, 1] that influences, but does not 
perfectly determine, the level of a public good that is provided to voters, g ∈ {0, 1}. Specifically, the 
probability with which the public good is provided is equal to e: Pr(g = 1|e) = e. The (representative) voter 
values only the public good; thus E[g] = e is also the voter’s expected utility. 
Politicians are one of two types – normal or corrupt – with µ denoting the proportion of normal 
types in the infinite pool of potential candidates. Normal types may choose to work to avoid corruption 
and mishandling of public funds by exerting costly effort e. Their per-period utility while in office is u(e) 
= R – c(e), where R (R > 0) are ego-rents, salary, and other fixed benefits of holding office. The cost of 
effort is increasing and convex in its level (c'(e) > 0, c''(e) > 0 for all e > 0), as well as satisfying the 
conditions for an interior solution (c(0) = c'(0) = 0, and c(1) >  ).
20 Payoffs outside of office are 
normalized to 0. In contrast, corrupt politicians always choose to exert no effort (e = 0). This may be 
because  effort  is  too  costly  for  them  for  it  to  be  worth  exerting  (i.e.,  c'(e)  is  very  large)  or  due  to 
incompetence. Politicians and the voter have a common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1). 
Each politician is infinitely lived and may serve for as many periods (i.e., terms) in office as the 
voter asks him to. However, once replaced by a randomly selected challenger, a politician cannot return to 
office. Finally, we assume that a politician’s type and action (e) are private information of the politician – 
not observable by voters. Thus, voters must infer incumbents’ type and action from their performance. 
To help remedy this monitoring problem, and to help voters keep politicians in line, the OCPR 
conducts  periodic  audits  in  which  the  financial  activities  of  the  government  are  scrutinized  and  any 
                                                 
20 The lower bound on c that we impose may be more restrictive than is necessary for an interior solution. The fully specified 
condition, its motivation, and implications are discussed in detail in Online Appendix A.   12 
irregularities  are  reported  to  voters. W e  i n t e r p r e t  a u d i t s  a s  m a k i n g  p o l i t i c i a n s ’  e f f o r t ,  e,  publicly 
observable and we write at = 1 to denote an audit at time t (and at = 0 otherwise)
21. An audit will take 
place  before  any  given  election  with  probability  p  ∈ ( 0 , 1 ) .  T o  m a t c h  t h e  c o n t e x t ,  w e  a s s u m e  t h a t  
politicians know whether they will be audited when making corruption/effort decisions. 
The voter assigns in each period t a probability µt that the incumbent is a normal type; this is the 
politician’s reputation. Because, following the literature, we assume that new politicians are selected 
randomly, the reputation of a politician at the beginning of his first term is µ. Thereafter, the incumbent’s 
reputation is updated according to Bayes’ rule each time the voter observes g or e, via a function that we 
denote  . 
The timing of the infinitely repeated stage game is as follows. At the beginning of each period, 
voters decide whether to re-elect the incumbent or select a challenger who has been drawn at random 
from the pool of potential politicians. Then, the OCPR announces whether there will be an audit during 
the current period. Taking this into account, the politician makes an effort choice, after which voters 
observe their payoffs and audit results when available, and update their beliefs regarding the incumbent’s 
type. 
When making re-election decisions, the voter has information on all past realizations of g, audits, 
and election results, which we call a t-history ht. Thus, a re-election strategy is a function from the set of 
all  such  possible  t-histories  to  the  incumbent’s  probability  of  re-election:  σ  :  H→[0,1].  Similarly,  a 
politician’s effort strategy is a function from all possible histories of outcomes, as well as whether there 
will be an audit (at ∈ {0,1}) during the current period, to an effort choice: e : H × {0,1}→[0,1]. Given 
strategies and beliefs, we can write the voter’s value function, before it is known whether there will be an 
audit, recursively: 
    (1) 
where p ∈ (0,1) denotes the probability of an audit, and the expectation is taken over the level of public 
goods as well as whether there is an audit and, if so, its results. Similarly, we denote the value function of 
a normal incumbent politician  : 
  .  (2) 
As in most infinitely repeated games, there are many candidate equilibria. Following Schwabe 
(2010), we argue that a class of perfect public equilibria of this game – reputation-dependent performance 
cutoffs (RDC) equilibria – are particularly convincing because they meet a stringent test of credibility on 
                                                 
21 The event at =1 in the model corresponds to a pre-election audit in the data. The event at =0 corresponds to a post-election 
audit whose results will not be disseminated.   13 
the part of the voter. In RDC equilibria, incumbents are re-elected only if their observed performance 
exceeds a cutoff that varies with the incumbent’s reputation.
22 Crucially, these performance cutoffs vary 
in such a way as to make it incentive compatible for politicians to exert just enough effort to leave the 
voter indifferent between re-electing the incumbent and electing a challenger, thus making the voter’s 
payoffs (i.e., value function) constant across reputations. If this is the case, voters face no commitment 
problem  when  making  re-election  decisions  because  they  will  be  indifferent  between  having  the 
incumbent or a (randomly selected) challenger in office.
23 We further restrict our attention to the RDC 




A voter-optimal RDC equilibrium with value V is an equilibrium in which: 
•  Politicians follow an effort strategy e(µt,a) that satisfies voter-indifference: V(µt) = V for all 
politicians with reputation µt ∈ [µ,1]. 




•  The voter’s constant per-period expected utility V(1-δ) is maximized subject to these constraints. 
 
In the voter-optimal RDC equilibrium of this model politicians are only re-elected if they have 
revealed themselves to be normal. Thus, there are only two relevant levels of incumbent reputation: µ and 
1. The only other factor that may affect the level of effort exerted by a politician is whether there will be 
an  audit  during  the  current  period.  We  refer  to  the  states  of  the  world  in  which  the  incumbent  has 
reputation µt = µ as states {µ,a=1},{µ,a=0} and the states in which the incumbent has reputation µt = 1 as 
{1,a=1} and {1,a=0}. Correspondingly, let eµ,a=1, eµ,a=0, e1,a=1, and e1,a=0 denote the equilibrium levels of 
effort in these states, respectively. In order to lighten notation, we will denote es = pes,a=1 + (1	 ﾠ–	 ﾠp)es,a=0 
where s ∈ (µ,1), for ex-ante expected levels of effort. 
                                                 
22 This stands in contrast to equilibria in which voters use performance standards to make re-election decisions without being 
responsive  to  an  incumbent’s  reputation.  In  these  equilibria  the  voter’s  continuation  payoffs  vary  systematically  with  the 
incumbent’s reputation, and the voters will be expected to throw incumbents out of office who would normally outperform 
challengers.  That  is,  the  voters  face  a  commitment  problem  which  undermines  the  credibility  of  their  re-election  strategy. 
Formally, these equilibria are not weakly renegotiation-proof (WRP, Farrell and Maskin 1989). 
23 Because these equilibria depend on the history of play ht only through the incumbent’s current reputation µt, we write value 
functions and strategies as functions of reputation. To lighten notation, we also drop the dependence of value functions on 
equilibrium strategies.   14 
 
Theorem 1: In the voter-optimal RDC equilibrium, the voter uses the following re-election strategy: 
a)  Following a politician’s first term in office, given an audit: 
 
b)  Following a politician’s first term in office, given no audit: 
 
c)  Following a politician’s second or higher term in office, given an audit: 
 
d)  Following a politician’s second or higher term in office, given no audit: 
 
where r ≥ 0. 
 
Proof: See Online Appendix A. 
 
When there is an audit, the effort level is observed and perfectly reveals the incumbent’s type as well as 
any deviation from the equilibrium level of effort. The voter’s re-election rule keeps an incumbent in 
office as long as he has behaved as a normal politician is expected to. Without an audit, the only credible 
signal of high effort is a high level of the public good (g=1). Incentives are at their strongest when failure 
to deliver the public good means that the incumbent will be thrown out of office, and this is what the 
voter does in state {µ,a=0}. 
 
Short-Run Accountability Effects of the Audits 
Because audits provide additional information about a politician’s actions, they enable the voter 
to punish high corruption and reward restraint more accurately, making incentives more effective. We 
thus expect that corruption will be lower during audited periods than during non-audited periods. Our first 
propositions support this intuition. 
 
Proposition 1: In the voter-optimal RDC equilibrium, eµ,a=1 > eµ,a=0 (first term politicians - reputation µ). 
Proof: See Online Appendix A. 
   15 
The second proposition states conditions under which there are positive disciplining effects of the 
audits for second or higher term incumbents. 
 
Proposition 2: In the voter-optimal RDC equilibrium, e1,a=1 > e1,a=0 if µeµ > eµ,a=0. Sufficient conditions for 
µeµ > eµ,a=0 are: 
(a) µ ≥  , where  ∈ (0,1) large enough; or, 
(b) c''(e) > K for all e and some constant K > 0 large enough. 
Proof: See Online Appendix A. 
 
  In general, it is plausible that among second or higher term incumbents, effort levels may be 
lower during audited periods than during non-audited periods. This is because incumbents with high 
reputations are expected to exert a lower average level of effort than first term incumbents. We thus 
identify conditions in which effort levels are higher – when competition from challengers is stark (i.e., a 
sufficiently high initial reputation level µ), or when the politician’s marginal cost of effort is high, driving 
a wedge between the effort levels incumbents are willing to exert during audited and non-audited periods. 
 
Effects on Short-Run Electoral Outcomes  
Again, because audits provide additional information about a politician’s actions, they enable the 
voter to punish high corruption and reward restraint more accurately, improving the degree of electoral 
accountability. In particular, the model predicts that the unconditional probability of re-election is higher 
during audited than during non-audited periods, but that this varies depending on the outcome of the 
audit, supporting our intuition.
24 Denote by qt|a=1 and qt|a=0 the re-election probability of the incumbent in 
period t given an audit and no audit in period t, respectively. 
 
Proposition 3: In the voter-optimal RDC equilibrium, qt|a=1 > qt|a=0. 
Proof: See Online Appendix A. 
 
The intuition is as follows: two things must happen in order for an incumbent to be re-elected: he 
must be a normal type, and the voter must see proof of this. While proof of a politician’s type is assured 
                                                 
24 We may also look at re-election rates conditional on corruption levels. Here again, the model predicts that re-election rates will 
be higher during audited periods in which there is low corruption. However, there is no difference in re-election rates when there 
is high corruption as these incumbents are always thrown out of office. When we take this prediction to the data, we must keep in 
mind the possibility that the number of corruption findings corresponding to e = 0 may vary among municipalities, so that the 
proportion falling into the high corruption category may be increasing with the level of reported corruption.   16 
during an audited period, it is only received probabilistically when there is no audit. Therefore, re-election 
rates unconditional on corruption levels should be higher during audited than during non-audited periods. 
 
Effects of the Audits on Politician Effort in Future Periods 
In equilibrium, the voter must be indifferent between having an incumbent with a high reputation 
and a new incumbent (with reputation µ). Therefore, politicians of all reputations will perform equally 
well (or poorly) in expectation so that the voter is indifferent between re-electing them and electing a 
challenger.
25 T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  p o l i t i c i a n s  w i t h  h i g h  r e p u t a t i o n s  w i l l  p o c k e t  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  their 
accumulated reputation by being more corrupt than normal politicians of lower reputations. Interestingly, 
the model predicts that reported corruption from future audits should be, on average, constant across 
municipalities that faced an audit in an earlier period and those that did not. 
 
Proposition 4: In the voter-optimal RDC equilibrium, the ex-ante expected level of effort will be constant 
across reputations,  , so that the voter’s expected stage-game utility is µe0 + (1 – µ)0 = e1 in 
both states. 
Proof: See Online Appendix A. 
 
Another intriguing prediction of RDC equilibrium involves the dynamics of corruption choices. 
As we argued above, politicians reap the benefits of their accumulated reputations by being more corrupt. 
This means that audits showing very low corruption will typically involve normal politicians, early in 
their career, who are showing great restraint in order to build up their reputation. Good audit results mean 
that voters will update their beliefs about the incumbent upwards. Perversely, this then allows politicians 
to be more corrupt in future periods. Formally, because in RDC equilibrium ex-ante expected effort is 
constant, E(et+1| ht )=  , the expected change in effort is simply the difference between today’s effort 
level and  or: 
  .  (3) 
Thus,  audits  showing  low  corruption  (high  effort)  will  be  followed,  on  average,  by  audits  showing 
moderate  corruption  (moderate  effort).  This  increase  in  corruption  will  be  larger  when  current  audit 
results are cleaner. 
 
Effects on Politician Selection and Electoral Outcomes in Future Periods 
                                                 
25 This type of voter indifference is a part of any renegotiation proof equilibrium. See Proposition 3 in Schwabe (2010).   17 
We  can  use  the  model’s  predictions  about  re-election  rates  to  draw  conclusions  about  the 
politician selection effects of audits. Specifically, are incumbents more likely to be normal following an 
audited  period  compared  to  a  non-audited  period?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  affirmative.  For 
incumbents in their first period, only normal types are re-elected, and they are re-elected with higher 
probability during audited periods. Specifically, the probability of having a normal incumbent during 
period t+1 conditional on having a first term incumbent during period t is: µ + (1 – µ)µ if there was an 
audit conducted during period t, and µeµ,a=0 + (1 – µeµ,a=0)µ if there was not. Similarly, incumbents in their 
second  or  higher  terms  are  re-elected  with  probability  1  following  audited  periods,  and  only  with 
probability e1,a=0 + (1 – e1,a=0)(r + (1 – r)µ) following non-audited periods.
26 
Finally, the model predicts that both the selection and sanctioning effects should induce higher re-
election rates of incumbents in the following election, particularly among mayors that audits show have 
refrained from rent seeking in the previous audit. Denote by qt+1|a=1 (qt+1|a=0) the re-election probability of 
the incumbent in period t+1 given an audit (no audit) in period t. 
 
Proposition 5: In the voter-optimal RDC equilibrium, qt+1|a=1 > qt+1|a=0. 
Proof: See Online Appendix A. 
 
The proposition formalizes the following logic: conducting an audit means that voters will be more likely 
to re-elect normal politicians, and normal politicians are more likely to do well enough to get re-elected in 
subsequent periods – there is a selection effect on re-election rates. Moreover, although higher reputation 
implies lower effort by the incumbent, in equilibrium voter re-election thresholds (r) are lower and thus 
easier to meet. Thus, both selection and sanctioning effects influence period t+1 re-election rates in the 
same direction. 
 
V. Empirical Framework 
We are interested in examining the dynamic consequences of providing information to voters 
from audit reports on rent-seeking behaviors in local governments. In particular, our objective is to test 
the following predictions of our political agency model: 
(i)  the expected dissemination of the audit reports should decrease the number of corrupt violations 
by incumbent politicians in the short-run (Propositions 1 and 2); 
                                                 
26 It is also worth noting that the probability of having a normal type in office during period t+1 is higher when there is a normal 
type in office during period t. This means that the selection effects of audits are persistent: for any integer n, the probability of 
having a normal type in office during period t+n is higher if there was an audit during period t than if there was not.   18 
(ii)  the incumbent’s likelihood of re-election should be higher on average during periods audited pre-
election than during those audited post-election (Proposition 3); the probability of re-election 
should be negatively correlated with the number of corruption findings; 
(iii) politicians  in  power  in  the  next  term  will  engage  on  average  in  the  same  level  of  corrupt 
violations i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  m u n i c i p a l i t y  b e i n g  a u d i t e d  p r e c e d i n g  o r  a f t e r  t h e  e l e c t i o n  
(Proposition 4); and, 
(iv)  on average, re-election rates at time t+1 should be higher in municipalities that experienced a pre-
election audit at time t relative to those that did not (Proposition 5). 
These are the main testable predictions that we take to the data. 
Our research design exploits the pre-determined routine nature of the publicly released audit 
reports and the timing of the municipal elections. We compare the outcomes for municipalities whose 
audit reports were disseminated in the two-year period before each election, relative to those whose audit 
reports were disseminated in the two-year period following each election, for the election years 1988 
through  2000.  Although  municipalities  are  not  audited  at  random,  we  can  examine  whether  this 
comparison presents problems of identification in various ways. In the following paragraphs we present 
the empirical specifications used to test these hypotheses, and discuss potential threats to validity. 
We estimate the average effect of the expected dissemination of the audits on short-term rent-
seeking levels using the following reduced-form specification: 
  cmt = θAmt + βXmt + γt + αm + εmt,  (4) 
where cmt denotes the number of corrupt violations per report in municipality m around election year t, 
and Amt is an indicator for whether or not the municipality audit report was published in the two-year 
period preceding election year t. Xmt is a vector of municipality and mayor characteristics that influence 
the m u n i c i p a l i t y ’ s  l e v e l  o f  c o r r u p t i o n .
27  The  terms  αm a n d  γt  represent  municipality  and  election 
intercepts, respectively, and εmt denotes unobserved characteristics that determine corruption at time t. 
Under the assumption that Amt is strictly exogenous, the coefficient θ provides a consistent estimate of the 
average effect of the audit dissemination on rent-seeking in municipal governments at time t, capturing 
both the effect of expecting to be audited and the public release of this information. Our model (as well as 
other models of political agency) predicts that θ < 0.
28 
                                                 
27 We use as controls the number of municipality government reports, the number of municipal public corporation or consortium 
reports; indicators for the mayor’s membership in the NPP, for the incumbent being in the opposition party to the state-level 
executive government, and for the incumbent being in the opposition party to the governor who appointed the Comptroller; the 
vote share for the incumbent in the previous election; and the incumbent’s number of terms in office. 
28 The empirical model captures the idea of “recency bias” – that voters take into account more recent conditions in making 
electoral decisions, and this thus influence the equilibrium behavior of incumbents. See Berry and Howell (2007), and the survey 
by Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000).   19 
An  analogous  model  that  uses  as  dependent  variable  an  indicator  for  the  re-election  of  the 
incumbent mayor in election year t (denoted emt) captures the average effects of the audits and their actual 
dissemination on the incumbent’s electoral accountability. We also test whether the dissemination of the 
audits  increases  the  likelihood  of  re-election  among  politicians  exerting  high  effort  (zero  reported 
corruption),  and  decreases  the  likelihood  of  re-election  of  those  mayors  shown  to  have  engaged  in 
corruption. Therefore, following Ferraz and Finan (2008), we estimate the model: 
  emt = θE1Amt + θE2Amtcm,t + βE1cm,t + βE2Xmt + γt + αm + εmt,  (5) 
Our model (as well as other models of political agency) predicts that θE1 > 0 and θE2 < 0. 
To examine the dynamic consequences of providing information to voters from the audits on the 
rent-seeking  behaviors  in  local  governments,  we  estimate  the  average  effect  of  the  audits  (and  their 
dissemination) in term t on the reported rent-seeking levels in the subsequent audit: 
  cm,t+1 = θPAmt + βXmt + γt+1 + αm + εm,t+1,  (6) 
where cm,t+1 denotes the number of corrupt violations per report in municipality m in the subsequent audit, 
Amt is the indicator for whether or not the municipality audit report was published in the two-year period 
preceding election year t, and εm,t+1 denotes unobserved characteristics that determine corruption at time 
t+1. T h e  t h e o r y  p r e d i c t s  t h a t  θP =  0  a s  the  incumbent  will  engage  on  average  in  the  same  level  of 
corruption after an audited period than after a non-audited period. In all longer-term effects specifications, 
we also include a control for the timing of the next audit (Am,t+1, an indicator for whether or not the 
municipality audit report was published in the two-year period preceding the next election year).
29 
We further decompose the effects of the pre-election audit by the identity of the agent – the 
mayor or vice-mayor, or another employee of the municipality – identified in the report as committing the 
corrupt violation. This distinction may be informative, as it allows us to assess whether voters respond 
differently to direct violations by mayors and those by other municipal employees. 
The overall comparison of municipalities does not capture the possibility that the outcome of the 
publicly released audit (at time t) contains information about the corrupt behaviors of the (possibly prior) 
incumbent mayor and other municipal government employees. Specifically, we expect the incumbent 
politician  in  the  next  term  to  engage  in  more  [less]  corrupt  activities  the  more  [less]  favorable  the 
outcome of the previous period audit. However, this pattern of “mean reversion” should be constant in 
municipalities receiving a pre-election versus post-election audits (since  , irrespective 
of the outcome of the audit at time t). To test for these possibly heterogeneous patterns, we estimate 
                                                 
29 The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar irrespective of the inclusion of the future audit timing control. Estimates 
are available from the authors upon request.   20 
dynamic panel models that include an interaction of the pre-election status of the audit report with the 
level of corruption reported in the audit at time t: 
  cm,t+1 = θP1Amt + θP2Amtcm,t + β1cm,t + β2Xmt + γt+1 + αm + εm,t+1,  (7) 
where all variables are defined as above. The θP1 parameter estimate captures the effect of the pre-election 
audit on subsequent rent seeking activities given a favorable review in the period t audit (i.e., cm,t = 0), 
whereas θP2 captures the differential effect of the pre-election audit given a less favorable outcomes of the 
previous audit (i.e., an additional finding of corruption in the preceding audit). We will test whether θP1 = 
θP2 = 0. 
Since equation (7) is a dynamic panel data model, it is well known that, even if cmt and εm,t+1 are 
not correlated, for small t then estimation of the fixed effects model using either a within groups or a first 
differences estimator is not consistent (e.g., Nickell 1981, Arellano and Bond 1991). Specifically, taking 
first differences of equation (7): 
  cm,t+1 – cm,t = θP1(Am,t – Am,t-1) + θP2(Am,tcm,t – Am,t-1cm,t-1) + β1(cm,t – cm,t-1) 
  + β2(Xm,t – Xm,t-1) + (γt+1 – γt) + (εm,t+1 – εm,t),  (7') 
and since E[cm,t εm,t] ≠ 0, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable will generate bias in the OLS 
estimates  of  the  coefficients  of  interest  (θP1 a n d  θP2),  even  under  the  assumption  that  Am,t i s  s t r i c t l y  
exogenous. We show in Appendix C that the OLS estimates of coefficients θP1 and θP2 in equation (7') are 
biased towards zero, in favor of finding the hypothesized relationship of interest.
30 
An IV estimator for the first-differenced panel data model is based on the one first proposed by 
Anderson  and  Hsiao  (1981,  1982).  It  uses  the  second  lag  of  the  dependent  variable  (cm,t-2)  and  its 
interaction with the second lag of the audit variable (Am,t-2 cm,t-2) – variables uncorrelated with the first-
differenced error term – as IVs for (Am,tcm,t – Am,t-1cm,t-1 ) and (cm,t – cm,t-1), the variables that are correlated 
with the error term. Under the assumption of strict exogeneity of the audits and no serial correlation in the 
error terms, and given the robustness of the instruments, this IV estimator provides consistent estimates of 
coefficients θP1 and θP2. 
 
VI. Results 
VI.A. Short-Run Accountability and Politician Selection Effects 
                                                 
30 The OLS estimate of equation (11ƹ′) leads to a downward bias in the coefficient θP1 and an upward bias in the coefficient on 
θP2. That is, against finding the inverse relationship of interest – an increase in corruption as a response to a more favorable audit 
in the earlier period and a decrease in corruption as a response to a less favorable audit in the earlier period. See Appendix B for 
details.   21 
We first present evidence of the short-run effects of the audit program on the corrupt behaviors of 
incumbent politicians and other municipal employees (Table II). Estimates of the average effects of the 
pre-election audit show a systematic reduction in the number of corrupt violations in the municipality. 
There are 1.43 (66 percent) fewer reported corrupt violations in the pre-election audit municipalities 
relative to those audited post-election (column 1). We also find 0.63 (67 percent) fewer corrupt violations 
per report by the mayor or vice-mayor (column 2), which suggests that there is a very limited (if any) shift 
in  the  corrupt  violations  charges  – i n  r e a l i t y  o r  found  by  the  auditors  – b e t w e e n  m a y o r s  a n d  o t h e r  
municipality employees. This estimate suggests that the disciplining effects are not concentrated strictly 
among  elected  officials  of  the  municipality.  In  particular,  the  estimated  reductions  are  of  similar 
magnitude (in proportional terms) across top management, rank and file employees, and unidentified 
municipality employees (not reported in the tables). We find comparable effects using a more stringent 
measure of corruption – the number of findings (per report) of misuse of public funds referred to the P.R. 
Department of Justice; the point estimate indicates 0.65 (66 percent) fewer violations per report among 
municipalities  that  were  audited  prior  to  the  elections  relative  to  those  that  were  audited  afterwards 
(column  3).  Importantly,  these  relationships  are  stable  and  robust  to  controls  (not  reported)  and  to 
focusing on the subset of municipalities in which the incumbent runs for re-election (columns 6-7, 9). 
We  also  examine  whether  the  disciplining  effects  vary  by  the  tenure  of  the  politician,  as 
suggested by the theory (specifications with interaction of pre-election audit and the number of terms in 
office of the politician). Although the point estimates suggest that higher tenure incumbents tend to be 
less disciplined by the pre-election audits, the estimated differential effects are small and statistically 
insignificant form zero (columns 3, 5). Again, these results are robust to focusing on municipalities in 
which the incumbent runs for re-election (columns 8, 10). 
We now focus on the short-run effects of the audit program on electoral accountability at the 
municipality level – i.e., incumbent mayors’ re-election rates. We start the discussion with a graphical 
analysis to shed light on the patterns in the data. Figure II depicts incumbent mayors’ successful re-
election rates as a function of the reported corrupt violations per report in the municipality, distinguishing 
between municipalities whose audit reports were published in the two-year period prior to the election 
(represented by a solid red line) and those whose reports were published in the two-year period following 
each election (represented by a dashed green line).
31 Panel A is based on a measure of the mayor’s 
successful re-election or otherwise (i.e. not run for re-election, or lose in primary or general election), 
whereas Panel B uses a measure of the incumbent’s re-election rate conditional on running for re-election. 
                                                 
31 The reported differences between pre-election and post-election audit municipalities are regression-adjusted for election period 
fixed effects.   22 
Incumbent mayors in municipalities whose reports were published pre-election exhibit a clear 
downward-sloping trend between successful re-election rates and the number of corrupt violations per 
report. Among the municipalities with no reported violations, re-election rates are 39 percent, and reduce 
consistently  to  approximately  20 p e r c e n t  a m o n g  i n c u m b e n t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  c h a r g e d  w i t h  u p  t o  t w o  
violations (moderate corruption), and to 9 percent among administrations charged with more than two 
violations  (high  corruption).  In  contrast,  the  relationship  among  municipalities  whose  reports  were 
published following the election is less stark; re-election rates are similar at 40 percent among those 
administrations with favorable audits, and decrease at a slower rate to 22 percent and 18 percent for 
administrations  with  moderate  and  high  corruption  levels,  respectively.  The  relationship  among 
incumbent  mayors  who  run  for  re-election  in  the  general  election  is  even  starker. I t  a l s o  s h o w s  n o  
evidence of a reward for mayors receiving favorable or moderately unfavorable audits, but a large penalty 
of 17 percentage points among those administering municipalities with high levels of reported corruption. 
The contrast of these two relationships suggests that voters do care about corruption, and hold corrupt 
politicians accountable when informed. This evidence is consistent with previous work on municipal 
audit programs and electoral accountability, as shown by Ferraz and Finan (2008) for mayors in Brazil. 
Parametric  linear  probability  estimates  of  the  reduced-form  relationship  following e m p i r i c a l  
model (4) capture the results depicted above (see Table III, columns 1-4). Although incumbent mayors’ 
overall successful re-election rates are not significantly correlated with the number of corrupt violations 
among pre-election audit municipalities (column 1-2), the relationship is strongly negative among those 
incumbent mayors running for re-election in the general election. The point estimate indicates that the 
probability of a successful re-election is 6.0 percentage points (19 percent) lower for each additional 
finding per report (column 4). Overall, the estimated relationships support the hypothesis that information 
about corrupt violations induces an improvement in electoral accountability. 
Finally, we present evidence on the effects of the audits on the selection of politicians in this 
election  (see  Table  III,  columns  5-8).  Following  the  theoretical  literature  on  politician’s  wages  and 
politician selection, we use the elected mayor’s household per capita earnings five years preceding the 
respective election year as a plausible measure of the competence of the politician elected into office. The 
point estimates of the average effects of the pre-election audit show a slight degree of positive selection of 
higher earnings politicians in the municipality, overall and among the subset of municipalities in which 
incumbent mayors ran for re-election (columns 1 and 3). These suggest that on average elected mayors 
following pre-election audits have earned an additional $5,720 to $6,680 USD per capita (13-15 percent), 
respectively; however, these effects are imprecisely estimated. However, there is a positive earnings-
selection  effect  among  municipalities  with  non-zero  levels  of  corruption,  as  captured  by  parametric 
estimates of the reduced-form relationship following empirical model (7). The point estimate indicates   23 
that those (re-)elected mayors have earned an additional $11,780 USD per capita (27 percent) for each 
additional finding per report (column 2). The degree of earnings-based selection is similar among the sub-
sample  of  municipalities  where  the  incumbent  runs  for  re-election,  at  $10,910  USD  per  capita  (25 
percent)  per  additional  violation  (column  4).  Overall,  the  estimates  support  the  hypothesis  that 
information about corrupt violations induces a degree of pre-incumbency earnings-based selection. 
 
VI.B. Average Effects of the Audits on Subsequent Rent-Seeking Levels 
We start by examining trends in the level of corruption for municipalities being audited in the two 
years before election period t, compared to those audited in the following two years. Figure III plots the 
average number of corrupt violations per report from audits one and two terms before election t, around 
the election in year t, and in the following audit.  We show the trends separately for municipalities with a 
pre-election t audit (represented by the solid red line) and for municipalities with a post-election t audit 
(represented by the dashed green line). Panel A is based on the total number of violations per report in the 
audit, whereas Panel B uses only the number of violations attributed to the mayor or vice-mayor. 
There are no discernible differences in the levels of reported corruption across these two groups 
of municipalities in earlier audits – the mean number of violations per report revolves around 1.6 and 
those  attributed  to  the  mayor  or  vice-mayor  around  0.70  and  the  differences  are  statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. In contrast, for audits around election t there is a stark decrease of 1.37 (= 
|0.80 – 2.17|) violations per report among municipalities facing a pre-election audit, relative to those 
facing  a  post-election  audit.  A  similar  pattern  holds  for  the  number  of  violations  attributed  to  the 
municipality-level executives (0.64 = |0.31 – 0.95|). This difference is consistent with the regression-
based  results  above  showing  a  substantial  short-run  disciplining  effect  by  incumbents  facing  greater 
scrutiny (see Section VI.A). Finally, comparing these groups of municipalities in the next round of audits 
(around election t+4), we find that the difference in corruption levels decreases substantially to 0.37 (= 
|1.25 – 1.62|) violations per report and is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Again, we find a similar 
pattern for the number of violations by the municipal executives during this later audit (0.18 = |0.54 – 
0.72|). The graphical evidence strongly suggests that the disciplining effects of the pre-election audits are 
short-lived. 
Parametric estimates of the longer-run effects of the pre-election audits on the number of corrupt 
violations in the subsequent term allow us to formally test for these effects (Table IV). The point estimate 
from the average effects model (equation [6]) with municipality and election-specific intercepts (as well 
as municipality and mayor controls) indicates a (statistically insignificant) decrease of 0.16 of a corrupt 
violation per report (10 percent) among the pre-election audit municipalities (column 1). The relationship 
remains unchanged when focusing on the number of violations by the mayor or vice-mayor (column 2).   24 
The point estimate from this specification implies a small decrease in rent-seeking of 0.09 of a violation 
(13 percent). Using the more stringent measure of corruption – the number of findings referred to the 
Department of Justice – gives even starker results (column 3). The point estimate implies no difference in 
the number of violations. Moreover, the results are robust to examining the sub-sample of municipalities 
in which the incumbent ran for re-election at time t (columns 4-6). In fact, the point estimates from these 
specifications suggest an increase in corruption, although these are statistically indistinguishable from 
zero.  The  specification  using  the  number  of  “DoJ-referred”  findings  suggests  an  increase  in 
approximately one third of a violation; moreover, we can reject a decrease in corruption greater than 
0.065 violations (12 percent) with 95 percent confidence.
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We also examine whether there is heterogeneity in the relationship between the audits and longer-
term  levels  of  corruption  levels,  based  on  characteristics  of  the  municipality  or  of  the  (originally 
incumbent) mayor (Table V). Consistent with the theory, the next period’s effects of the audits induce 
greater discipline among incumbents with fewer terms in office than among those with more experience, 
as these mayors are more likely to respond to the auditing scheme to build up their reputation (columns 1-
3).  We  also  expect  the  following  term’s  levels  of  corruption  to  be  lower  in  jurisdictions  where 
competition from challengers is stark (e.g., a sufficiently high initial reputation level µ). Although we 
cannot observe the baseline reputation of opposition candidates, we operationalize this idea by examining 
jurisdictions where the incumbent won in the previous election (period t – 4) with a varying win margin 
(columns 4-6). Although imprecisely estimated, our results are consistent with this idea – in competitive 
jurisdictions, we observe moderately lower levels of corruption in future periods, and this  long-term 
discipline effect is decreasing in the degree of lop-sidedness of the jurisdiction. Finally, we test whether 
the disciplining effects are more likely to take place in jurisdictions with a higher proportion of well-
educated individuals – we interact the pre-election audit with the proportion of adults with a university (or 
post-graduate) degree in the municipality as measured in the preceding census (columns 7-9). Again, our 
results are consistent with the idea that a more-educated populace is better able to select and/or discipline 
politicians in the long term – although these patterns are somewhat imprecisely estimated. 
In summary, we conclude that the disciplining effects of the pre-election audits are short-lived. 
This is consistent with the idea that politicians in power in the next term will engage on average in the 
same level of rent-seeking after an audited period than after a non-audited period, because their increased 
reputation for competence allows them to engage in greater rent-seeking. Thus in the next sub-section, we 
                                                 
32 We generally have sufficient precision to reject moderately sized reductions in the number of violations. For instance, the 
lower 95 percent confidence interval from specification (4) is -0.48; that is, a 32 percent reduction in the number of violations. 
The results are robust to exploring the extensive margin only – indicator variables for whether there is reported corruption in the 
audit. Estimates are available in Appendix Table A1.   25 
examine other predictions of our theory to evaluate in more detail whether these dynamic incentives are 
playing a role. 
 
VI.C. Dynamic Effects of the Audits on Subsequent Rent-Seeking Levels 
In this section we present preliminary graphical evidence on the short-term reported and the 
subsequent corruption levels; that is, the relationship between reported rent seeking levels over time for 
municipalities audited before and after the election at time t. Figure IV depicts this relationship: residual 
corruption  levels  after  removing  municipality  and  election  fixed  effects  for  municipalities  audited 
preceding an election, relative to those whose audit reports were published following the election. 
These  figures  provide  some  suggestive  evidence  of  the  model’s  predictions  on  dynamics  of 
corruption. First, the (expected) dissemination of the audit reports preceding an election decrease the 
short-run rent seeking behaviors of incumbent politicians in the municipalities, as the distribution of audit 
findings  is  compressed  towards  observing  fewer  corrupt  violations.  Second,  there  is  no  significant 
difference in reported rent seeking in the subsequent audit after an audited period than after a non-audited 
period,  as  the  average  of  the  residuals  is  approximately  the  same  for  municipal  governments  that 
experienced an audit in the preceding term and those that did not. 
Finally, there is no statistically significant relationship between unfavorable audit outcomes in a 
given audit and those in the subsequent audit among local governments that were not audited preceding 
the first election. Interestingly, this is also the case among governments that were audited preceding the 
first election. This is prima facie evidence that the change in corruption level is simply going to be the 
difference between the short-term corruption level and the expected level of corruption. The following 
analysis provides formal tests of this prediction. 
IV estimates from empirical models of equation (7') show that there is a significant increase in 
corruption among municipalities with no reported findings of corruption in the previous audit (Table VI). 
The  point  estimate  of  θP1  from  a  specification  with  a  linear  interaction  term  in  the  preceding  audit 
findings (and using all violations as dependent variable) indicates that the overall number of corrupt 
violations in the subsequent audit decrease by 0.06 of a violation among municipalities with a favorable 
outcome of the previous audit (column 2). Moreover, the estimate of θP2 implies a relative decrease of 
0.06 of a corrupt finding per each additional finding of corruption per report in the preceding audit. These 
estimates are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The resulting total effect given non-zero 
corrupt findings in the preceding audit are also small and not significantly indistinguishable from zero at 
conventional confidence levels. The same result holds when we focus on the outcomes for mayors with 
limited experience (those in their first term during the first audit – a specification with an interaction of 
the pre-election (t) audit and the incumbent’s terms in office in period t) (column 3).   26 
Since the theory makes predictions regarding the corrupt activities of the municipal government 
executive, we estimate specifications using as dependent variable the number of corrupt violations by the 
mayor or vice-mayor in the subsequent audit (columns 4-7). We also allow for heterogeneous responses 
by the number of violations attributed to the municipal executive (i.e., mayor or vice-mayor) versus other 
municipal employees (columns 6-7). The relationship remains unchanged when focusing on the number 
of violations by the mayor or vice-mayor, or using the more as our outcome measure the number of 
findings referred to the Department of Justice (columns 8-10). Moreover, the estimates from the sub-
sample of municipalities in which mayors ran for re-election at time t following the initial audit are very 
similar (see Appendix Table II).
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In sum, these robustness checks further indicate that reputation-dependent performance strategies 
are quite prevalent among incumbent politicians, allowing them to engage in greater rent seeking while in 
office.  Thus  in  the  next  sub-section,  we  examine  the  final  predictions  of  the  theory  regarding  the 
dynamic/longer-term consequences for incumbents’ re-election prospects. 
 
VI.D. Effects of the Audits on Long-Term Electoral Performance 
As the theory suggests, conducting an audit enables voters to re-elect normal politicians, and 
normal politicians are more likely to do well enough to get re-elected in subsequent periods – there is a 
selection effect on re-election rates. Moreover, although higher reputation implies lower effort by the 
incumbent, in equilibrium voter re-election thresholds (r) are lower and thus easier to meet. Thus, both 
selection and sanctioning effects influence future period re-election rates. Therefore, a final test of the 
model is that incumbents in the next term whose municipalities experienced a pre-election audit at time t, 
will be expected, on average, to have higher re-election rates in the following election (at time t+4). 
We  conduct  a  graphical  analysis  analogous  to  that  for  the  incumbents’  short-term  electoral 
accountability to shed light on the patterns in the data. Figure V depicts the next incumbent mayors’ 
successful re-election rates (at time t+4) as a function of the reported corrupt violations per report in the 
municipality at time t, distinguishing between municipalities whose audit reports were published in the 
two-year period prior to the election (represented by a solid red line) and those whose reports were 
published in the two-year period following each election (represented by a dashed green line).
34 Panel A 
is based on a measure of the mayor’s successful re-election or otherwise (i.e. not run for re-election, or 
lose in primary or general election), whereas Panel B uses a measure of the incumbent’s re-election rate 
conditional on running for re-election. 
                                                 
33 We also generate OLS estimates of equation (7') for purposes of comparing these with the analogous IV estimates. Consistent 
with the hypothesized direction of bias due to the nature of the dynamic panel model, the OLS estimate of coefficient θP1 is 
smaller than its IV analog, whereas that of coefficient θP2 is larger (estimates available upon request). 
34 Again, the reported differences between pre-election and post-election audit municipalities are regression-adjusted for election 
period fixed effects.   27 
Incumbent mayors in municipalities whose reports were published pre-election exhibit a clear 
downward-sloping trend between successful re-election rates and the number of corrupt violations per 
report. In stark contrast, there is no relationship among municipalities whose reports were published 
following the election. The graph shows evidence of a reward for mayors receiving favorable audits or 
audits with moderate corruption levels at time t, in spite of their substantial increases in corruption in the 
following audit. The difference among those municipalities with low (zero reported) corruption suggests a 
24 percentage point (= |0.44 – 0.20|) higher longer-term re-election rate of the incumbent, whereas among 
those with moderate corruption, the next incumbent experiences an electoral reward of 9 percentage 
points (= |0.28 – 0.19|). Interestingly, there is still a large penalty of 17 percentage points (= |0.09 – 0.26|) 
among those incumbents in municipalities with high levels of reported corruption at time t, as there is no 
modification  in  the  corrupt  actions  among  this  group.  This  evidence  strongly  suggests  that,  if  not 
indifferent, voters reward incumbents in spite of their increased rent-seeking in later periods. 
Parametric linear probability estimates of the reduced-form relationship again capture the results 
depicted above (Table VII). Although incumbent mayors’ overall successful re-election rates (in election 
t+4)  are  not  significantly  correlated  with t h e  n u m b e r  o f  c o r r u p t  v i o l a t i o n s  a m o n g  p r e -election  audit 
municipalities  (columns  1-4),  the  estimates  among  mayors  who  run  for  re-election  in  the  next  term 
experience  a  positive  shift  in  their  electoral  performance  (columns  5-8).  Overall,  these  estimated 
relationships support the hypothesis that information about corrupt violations induces an improvement in 
electoral accountability in the short-run, while having perverse incentives in the longer-run. 
 
VII. Testing for Alternative Explanations 
Manipulation of audits: The validity of our research design relies on three important conditions: (i) the 
exogenous timing of the audits, (ii) the fixed timing of municipal elections, and (iii) the comparability of 
the audit process across municipalities and across time. Even though we have shown that the timing of the 
audits is uncorrelated with observable characteristics of the municipality, one potential concern could lie 
in the actual audit process. Specifically, if the audits conducted in the two-year period before elections 
differed  systematically  from  those  conducted  after  elections,  then  our  empirical  strategy  would  be 
invalidated. An example of this type of concern is that the auditors themselves might have been corrupted. 
We thus follow Ferraz and Finan (2008) and assess multiple reasons for potential biases in the actual 
audit processes. 
If the actual initial audits were manipulated, then we might expect mayors who were politically 
affiliated with the party in power in the state government or with the party who appointed the Comptroller 
to receive more favorable audit reports. To assess this possibility, we estimate specifications that include 
as controls indicator variables for the incumbent being from a political party (i) in the opposition to the   28 
incumbent governor and (ii) in the opposition to the party of the governor who appointed the Comptroller, 
as well as their interaction with the pre-election audit indicator (Table VIII–columns 1, 3, 5). Including 
these  additional  controls  do  not  affect  the  main  responses  of  the  pre-election  audits  on  the  level  of 
reported violations. Moreover, estimates of these heterogeneous responses suggest that municipalities in 
the opposition to the party of the governor who appointed the Comptroller receive more favorable audit 
report outcomes, placating this concern. 
Another possibility previously raised in the literature is that incumbents who won by narrow 
margins  in  the  previous  election  have  a  greater  incentive t o  b r i b e  OCPR  auditors  to  receive  more 
favorable reports. To examine this threat to validity, we extend the baseline model to control for the 
incumbent’s margin of victory in the previous election and its interaction with the pre-election audit 
indicator  (Table  VIII,  columns  2,  4,  6).  Again,  we  do  not  find  substantial  evidence  that  a  mayor’s 
previous level of political support influenced the audit process and including these additional controls do 
not affect the main short-run responses of the pre-election audits. 
We  also  evaluate  whether  the  extent  of  subsequent  auditing  varied  significantly  across 
municipalities of different types. To do so, we estimate specifications using as dependent variables (i) an 
indicator for the existence of a subsequent audit report, and (ii) the number of reports from the subsequent 
audit  (Table  VIII,  columns  7-12).  The  estimates  indicate  no  evidence  of  selective  auditing,  or  of 
differential intensity of auditing, as measured by the number of reports.
35 
Finally, we examine whether there is evidence of manipulation of the next term audits, again 
based on the ideas that (i) mayors who were politically affiliated with the party in power in the state 
government or (ii) with the party who appointed the Comptroller, or (iii) who won by narrow margins in 
the previous election, to receive more favorable audit reports. To assess this possibility, we estimate 
analogous longer-term effects specifications that include the same control variables as discussed above. 
(Table IX). Again, we find that including these additional controls do not affect the main responses of the 
pre-election audits on the level of reported violations in the future term.
36 
Political cycles: A second concern is that political cycles are potentially correlated with our comparison 
of municipalities based on the timing of the audits. Municipalities receiving pre-election audits do cover 
time periods farther away from the election relative to those receiving later audits (see Table I, Panel A), 
which could affect the comparability of the audit outcomes across these groups. We examine whether this 
issue affects our results by controlling for the actual timing of the audited periods (i.e., the start of the 
                                                 
35 Analogous estimates for the sample of municipalities in which mayors choose to run for re-election in period t are available in 
Appendix Table III. 
36 We also carry out placebo tests, showing that the pre-election audit effects are uncorrelated with predetermined characteristics 
of the municipality, such as the preceding election win margin. Estimates are available from the authors upon request.   29 
audit period, and the time span of the audit period), and it influences none of our results (not reported in 
the tables – these are available from the authors upon request). 
Transfers from Central Government: It is plausible that the central government may have increased the 
level of transfers to municipalities after favorable audits (and reduced the flow of funds to municipalities 
after  instances  of  corruption  were  exposed  in  those  jurisdictions)  (Brollo  2010). I f  v o t e r s  r e w a r d  
politicians for obtaining more resources from higher levels of government, an increase in transfers by the 
central government could provide an incumbency advantage to the mayor, allowing him to engage in rent 
seeking activities in the future with lower risk of removal from office.
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To examine this hypothesis, we use the data on municipal government income statements, which 
provides us with the following additional revenue information: property tax, licensing, waste disposal 
services, transfers and other government revenues. We estimate the relationship between the pre-election 
audits and the fiscal year-specific revenues by source. To the extent that the available data allows us to 
assess this alternate explanation, we find no evidence o this channel in the data, at least in this context 
(estimates available upon request). 
Mayor’s Political Experience: If engaging in corrupt practices involves learning (by doing) or if it takes 
time to establish the networks that enable individuals to engage in corrupt practices, then the increase in 
corruption in municipalities could be the result of having more experienced mayors in office in a future 
term. On the other hand, experience could allow mayors to learn to engage in corrupt practices while 
reducing the likelihood of getting caught, leading to a downward bias in the estimated increases in corrupt 
practices in municipalities with previously favorable (pre-election) audits.  In any case, note that because 
short-run re-election rates do not differ among municipalities with favorable pre-election vs. post-election 
audits, there is no prima facie evidence of selection based on experience, on average. Therefore, to the 
extent that the available re-election data allows us to assess this explanation, the evidence is inconsistent 
with mayor experience driving our results. 
Strategic Challenger Entry: Is the reputation building that may take place simply a result of the observed 
performance of incumbent politicians, or do strategic actions by a more diverse group of agents in the 
political sphere (i.e., competing parties) can help inform voters about the characteristics of candidates in 
competition? We believe that these additional strategic interactions compound the effects discussed in the 
paper.  For  instance,  political  parties  can  strategically  choose  to  field  candidates  as  a  response  to 
information  voters  receive  about  the  corrupt  violations  by  incumbents.  Distinguishing  the  relative 
magnitudes of the incumbent’s own reputation from these additional interactions remains important work. 
                                                 
37 For evidence on the electoral consequences of fiscal transfers from higher levels of government, see Brollo et al. (2010) and 
Litschig and Morrison (2009).   30 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
The central goal of this paper is to study the long-run corruption consequences caused by the 
disclosure to voters of information about politicians’ corrupt actions. We develop a model of political 
agency and reputation building, and show that a politician whose reputation has improved in the past can 
exploit  these  information  asymmetries  to  engage  in  rent-seeking  activities,  leaving  voters  indifferent 
between re-electing him and electing an unknown challenger. Given these perverse reputation incentives, 
re-elected mayors who have been shown to have refrained from or engaged in rent-seeking activities in 
the past will be on average as corrupt in the next term as mayors whose levels of corruption have not 
been exposed. We then use unique longitudinal data on municipal government audits in Puerto Rico to 
study  this  relationship  empirically.  We  find  that  audits  lead  to  a  significant  short-term  reduction  in 
municipal corruption, as well as an increase in incumbent mayors’ electoral accountability. However, 
municipal corruption levels in the subsequent round of audits are on average the same in municipalities 
audited preceding the previous election and those whose audits became publicly available afterwards. 
Thus,  short-term  information  dissemination  policies  do  not  necessarily  align  politicians’  long-term 
actions with voter preferences as politicians exploit their reputational gains by extracting additional rents 
from office. 
Our  paper  contributes  to  the  ongoing  debate  regarding  the  nature  of  the  differences  among 
politicians, and the type of qualities that voters evaluate in their representatives (see, for instance, Fearon 
1999 and Besley 2005). One view is that some politicians are virtuous or honest and will do all they can 
to serve voters, while others are opportunistic and seek office primarily to extract rents from office. 
Another, possibly complementary, view holds that all politicians are opportunistic but differ in their 
ability or competence. The two positions have different implications for public policy as well as for our 
understanding of democracy. If we believe that some politicians are virtuous, we must also believe that 
policies that enable voters to evaluate politicians’ character can be just as effective as those which help 
voters evaluate their policies and rent-seeking activities. Furthermore, in this case, helping voters better 
select their politicians will have long-lasting effects on the quality of government as virtuous politicians 
will continue to govern well even when they have no signaling motive. On the other hand, if politicians 
differ mostly in their competence, the most effective policies are those that provide information to voters 
about incumbents’ actions in office, and the effects of these policies will be short-lived as opportunistic 
politicians take advantage of situations in which voters have less information about their actions in office. 
Our results provide strong, if context-specific, evidence for the second view. We find that, although the 
informational content of audits lowers corruption in the short-term and enables voters to re-elect better 
politicians, audits have no lasting effect on the level of corruption.   31 
Finally, our work follows the view that corrupt behavior is a choice made by policymakers and is 
a rational response to the structure of the political-economic environment, such as political institutions 
and (the inadequacy of) information (Pande 2007). It does not exclude, however, the possibility that the 
rational  behavior  of  politicians  in  democratic  governments  can  generate  or  perpetuate  “norms”  or 
“cultures” of corruption, as it can induce citizens to have “self-fulfilling prophecies” regarding the corrupt 
behavior of politicians. While institutional innovations such as audit programs can improve voter welfare 
– and the theoretical and empirical results that we present are consistent with voters taking full advantage 
of information in pre-election audits – it is possible for a society to remain in a sub-optimal equilibrium in 
which these innovations are ineffectual. This speaks to the debate in the literature on governance and 
political corruption on whether corruption is a social norm or habit that is pervasive in low- and middle-
income  countries,  or  whether  it  strictly  responds  to  structure.  These  general  queries  regarding  the 
determinants of good governance remain important questions for future research. 
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FIGURE I: TIMING OF PUBLICATION OF AUDIT REPORTS, 1985-2005 
 






PANEL B: SHARE OF ALL REPORTS ON MUNICIPALITIES WHERE 
INCUMBENT IS FROM OPPOSITION PARTY TO GOVERNOR / COMPTROLLER 
 
   
 
 
Notes: Panel A shows the timing of release of the number of reports by month in the four-year period around each election (in Nov. 1988, 1992, 
1996, 2000, and 2004). Panel B presents the share of published reports of municipalities in which the incumbent is in the opposition party to the 
Governor in office or to the Governor who appointed the Comptroller in office, in each month. The red line in each figure demarcates the mean 
for the 22 months before the November election; the green lines demarcate the mean for the 26 months following an election. 
   35 
FIGURE II: 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REPORTED CORRUPTION LEVELS AND ELECTORAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MUNICIPALITIES AUDITED BEFORE AND AFTER ELECTIONS 
 









Notes: The figures show the adjusted (by election intercepts) relationship between the mayors who were successfully re-elected in the election 
and the number of corrupt violations per report in the audits for municipalities audited before and after the elections.  36 
FIGURE III: 
NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS ACROSS TIME, BY PRE-ELECTION AUDIT IN ELECTION (t) 
 
 









Notes: The figures show the unadjusted relationship between the number of corrupt violations per report in each audit, for municipalities audited 
before and after the election at time (t).   37 
FIGURE IV: 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REPORTED CORRUPTION LEVELS AND SUBSEQUENT 
CORRUPTION LEVELS FOR MUNICIPALITIES AUDITED BEFORE AND AFTER ELECTIONS 
 









Notes: The figures plot residuals from a set of regressions of the number of findings of corruption per report in periods t and t+1, on election and 
municipality fixed effects.   38 
FIGURE V: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REPORTED CORRUPTION LEVELS AND LONG-TERM 
ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY (IN ELECTION AT TIME [t+4]) 
(FOR MUNICIPALITIES AUDITED BEFORE AND AFTER ELECTION (AT TIME [t]) 
 









Notes: The figures show the adjusted (by election intercepts) relationship between the mayors who were successfully re-elected in election at time 
(t+4) and the number of corrupt violations per report in the audits for municipalities audited before and after election at time (t).  
3
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i
t
y
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
r
 
c
o
n
s
o
r
t
i
u
m
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
;
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
f
o
r
 
N
e
w
 
P
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
i
v
e
 
P
a
r
t
y
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
h
i
p
,
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
-
l
e
v
e
l
 
e
x
e
c
u
t
i
v
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
o
r
 
w
h
o
 
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
e
d
 
C
o
m
p
t
r
o
l
l
e
r
;
 
t
h
e
 
v
o
t
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
t
-
4
)
;
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
’
s
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
i
n
 
o
f
f
i
c
e
 
(
a
t
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
i
s
 
c
o
m
p
o
s
e
d
 
o
f
 
a
l
l
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
h
a
d
 
a
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
a
u
d
i
t
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
1
9
8
7
-
2
0
0
2
.
 
T
h
e
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
“
P
r
e
-
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
u
d
i
t
s
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
”
 
r
e
f
e
r
s
 
t
o
 
a
 
t
e
s
t
 
o
f
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
P
r
e
-
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
u
d
i
t
 
a
n
d
 
i
t
s
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
 
i
n
 
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
)
.
 
  
4
3
 
 
T
A
B
L
E
 
I
V
:
 
T
H
E
 
E
F
F
E
C
T
S
 
O
F
 
T
H
E
 
A
U
D
I
T
S
 
O
N
 
T
H
E
 
N
U
M
B
E
R
 
O
F
 
C
O
R
R
U
P
T
 
V
I
O
L
A
T
I
O
N
S
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
 
S
U
B
S
E
Q
U
E
N
T
 
A
U
D
I
T
 
(
T
E
R
M
)
 
 
 
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
O
L
S
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
;
 
d
i
s
t
u
r
b
a
n
c
e
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
a
r
e
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
(
*
)
 
9
0
%
;
 
(
*
*
)
 
9
5
%
;
 
(
*
*
*
)
 
9
9
%
 
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
r
 
c
o
n
s
o
r
t
i
u
m
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
;
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
f
o
r
 
N
e
w
 
P
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
i
v
e
 
P
a
r
t
y
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
h
i
p
,
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
-
l
e
v
e
l
 
e
x
e
c
u
t
i
v
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
o
r
 
w
h
o
 
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
e
d
 
C
o
m
p
t
r
o
l
l
e
r
;
 
t
h
e
 
v
o
t
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
t
-
4
)
;
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
’
s
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
i
n
 
o
f
f
i
c
e
 
(
a
t
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
i
s
 
c
o
m
p
o
s
e
d
 
o
f
 
a
l
l
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
h
a
d
 
a
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
a
u
d
i
t
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
1
9
8
7
-
2
0
0
2
 
a
n
d
 
a
 
s
u
b
s
e
q
u
e
n
t
 
o
n
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
1
9
9
1
-
2
0
0
5
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
.
  
4
4
 
 
T
A
B
L
E
 
V
:
 
H
E
T
E
R
O
G
E
N
E
O
U
S
 
E
F
F
E
C
T
S
 
O
F
 
T
H
E
 
A
U
D
I
T
S
 
O
N
 
T
H
E
 
N
U
M
B
E
R
 
O
F
 
C
O
R
R
U
P
T
 
V
I
O
L
A
T
I
O
N
S
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
 
S
U
B
S
E
Q
U
E
N
T
 
A
U
D
I
T
 
(
T
E
R
M
)
 
 
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
O
L
S
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
;
 
d
i
s
t
u
r
b
a
n
c
e
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
a
r
e
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
(
*
)
 
9
0
%
;
 
(
*
*
)
 
9
5
%
;
 
(
*
*
*
)
 
9
9
%
 
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
r
 
c
o
n
s
o
r
t
i
u
m
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
;
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
f
o
r
 
N
e
w
 
P
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
i
v
e
 
P
a
r
t
y
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
h
i
p
,
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
-
l
e
v
e
l
 
e
x
e
c
u
t
i
v
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
o
r
 
w
h
o
 
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
e
d
 
C
o
m
p
t
r
o
l
l
e
r
;
 
t
h
e
 
v
o
t
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
t
-
4
)
;
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
’
s
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
i
n
 
o
f
f
i
c
e
 
(
a
t
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
i
s
 
c
o
m
p
o
s
e
d
 
o
f
 
a
l
l
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
h
a
d
 
a
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
a
u
d
i
t
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
1
9
8
7
-
2
0
0
2
 
a
n
d
 
a
 
s
u
b
s
e
q
u
e
n
t
 
o
n
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
1
9
9
1
-
2
0
0
5
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
.
  
4
5
 
T
A
B
L
E
 
V
I
:
 
R
O
B
U
S
T
N
E
S
S
 
T
E
S
T
S
 
-
 
E
F
F
E
C
T
S
 
O
F
 
T
H
E
 
A
U
D
I
T
S
 
O
N
 
T
H
E
 
N
U
M
B
E
R
 
O
F
 
C
O
R
R
U
P
T
 
V
I
O
L
A
T
I
O
N
S
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
 
S
U
B
S
E
Q
U
E
N
T
 
A
U
D
I
T
 
(
T
E
R
M
)
 
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
(
f
i
r
s
t
-
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
d
)
 
O
L
S
 
a
n
d
 
I
V
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
;
 
d
i
s
t
u
r
b
a
n
c
e
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
a
r
e
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
(
*
)
 
9
0
%
;
 
(
*
*
)
 
9
5
%
;
 
(
*
*
*
)
 
9
9
%
 
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
F
o
r
 
I
V
s
,
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
,
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
–
 
s
e
e
 
n
o
t
e
s
 
t
o
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
I
V
.
 
T
h
e
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
“
P
r
e
-
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
u
d
i
t
s
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
”
 
r
e
f
e
r
s
 
t
o
 
a
 
t
e
s
t
 
o
f
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
P
r
e
-
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
u
d
i
t
 
a
n
d
 
i
t
s
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
 
i
n
 
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
)
.
  
4
6
 
 
T
A
B
L
E
 
V
I
I
:
 
T
H
E
 
E
F
F
E
C
T
S
 
O
F
 
T
H
E
 
A
U
D
I
T
S
 
O
N
 
L
O
N
G
-
T
E
R
M
 
E
L
E
C
T
O
R
A
L
 
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
S
 
 
 
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
O
L
S
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
;
 
d
i
s
t
u
r
b
a
n
c
e
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
a
r
e
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
(
*
)
 
9
0
%
;
 
(
*
*
)
 
9
5
%
;
 
(
*
*
*
)
 
9
9
%
 
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
r
 
c
o
n
s
o
r
t
i
u
m
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
;
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
f
o
r
 
N
e
w
 
P
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
i
v
e
 
P
a
r
t
y
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
h
i
p
,
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
-
l
e
v
e
l
 
e
x
e
c
u
t
i
v
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
o
r
 
w
h
o
 
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
e
d
 
C
o
m
p
t
r
o
l
l
e
r
;
 
t
h
e
 
v
o
t
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
t
-
4
)
;
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
’
s
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
i
n
 
o
f
f
i
c
e
 
(
a
t
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
i
s
 
c
o
m
p
o
s
e
d
 
o
f
 
a
l
l
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
h
a
d
 
a
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
a
u
d
i
t
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
1
9
8
7
-
2
0
0
2
.
 
T
h
e
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
“
P
r
e
-
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
u
d
i
t
s
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
”
 
r
e
f
e
r
s
 
t
o
 
a
 
t
e
s
t
 
o
f
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
P
r
e
-
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
u
d
i
t
 
a
n
d
 
i
t
s
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
 
i
n
 
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
)
.
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T
A
B
L
E
 
V
I
I
I
:
 
T
E
S
T
I
N
G
 
F
O
R
 
M
A
N
I
P
U
L
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
T
H
E
 
A
U
D
I
T
I
N
G
 
P
R
O
C
E
S
S
 
 
 
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
O
L
S
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
;
 
d
i
s
t
u
r
b
a
n
c
e
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
a
r
e
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
(
*
)
 
9
0
%
;
 
(
*
*
)
 
9
5
%
;
 
(
*
*
*
)
 
9
9
%
 
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
r
 
c
o
n
s
o
r
t
i
u
m
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
;
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
f
o
r
 
N
e
w
 
P
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
i
v
e
 
P
a
r
t
y
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
h
i
p
,
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
-
l
e
v
e
l
 
e
x
e
c
u
t
i
v
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
o
r
 
w
h
o
 
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
e
d
 
C
o
m
p
t
r
o
l
l
e
r
;
 
t
h
e
 
v
o
t
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
t
-
4
)
;
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t
’
s
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
i
n
 
o
f
f
i
c
e
 
(
a
t
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
i
s
 
c
o
m
p
o
s
e
d
 
o
f
 
a
l
l
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
h
a
d
 
a
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
a
u
d
i
t
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
1
9
8
7
-
2
0
0
2
.
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T
A
B
L
E
 
I
X
:
 
T
E
S
T
I
N
G
 
F
O
R
 
M
A
N
I
P
U
L
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
T
H
E
 
A
U
D
I
T
I
N
G
 
P
R
O
C
E
S
S
 
(
C
O
N
T
.
)
 
 
 
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
O
L
S
 
a
n
d
 
(
f
i
r
s
t
-
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
d
)
 
I
V
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
;
 
d
i
s
t
u
r
b
a
n
c
e
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
a
r
e
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
(
*
)
 
9
0
%
;
 
(
*
*
)
 
9
5
%
;
 
(
*
*
*
)
 
9
9
%
 
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
F
o
r
 
I
V
s
,
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
,
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
–
 
s
e
e
 
n
o
t
e
s
 
t
o
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
I
V
.
 